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brush and wheel clutches simultaneously engaged, preventing any
backward thrust. Austin's expert
witness testified that a poorly designed interlock mechanism
caused the machine's sudden backward motion. The court concluded
that the interlock mechanism
could reasonably be construed as a
defect under the strict liability definition. The court further found
that the machine's bucking motion
could reasonably be construed to
have caused Austin's injury. Thus,
the court found that Austin had
presented to the trial court a prima
facie case sufficient to justify the
jury's verdict.
Assumption of Risk. Garlock
contended that the assumption of
risk defense barred any liability
and, therefore, required a judgment in its favor as a matter of law.
This contention, if accepted,
would relieve Garlock of liability.
To establish an assumption of risk
defense, Garlock had to prove that
Austin was aware of the specific
risk that the machine might knock
him backwards, appreciated the
magnitude of the risk, and voluntarily exposed himself to the danger. The appellate court noted that
Austin was an experienced roofer
who appreciated the inherent danger of working on rooftops. He
frequently had worked with the
sweeper and knew it exerted "some
backward pressure" each time he
started it. However, Austin testified that he did not realize the
sweeper could jump back in the
way it had on this occasion, and
that he had neither read the warning label nor received any instructions on operating safety. On the
strenghth of Austin's testimony,
the appellate court found that the
trial court properly denied the motion for directed verdict based on
assumption of risk.
"Carelessness" Not the Same
as "Misuse." Next, Garlock contended that Austin had misused
the machine. A product is not
considered defective if the consumer's misuse caused the injury.
According to Garlock, by using the
sweeper within two to five feet of
the roof s edge, despite the displayed warning label proscribing
operating the machine within ten
feet of a roof s edge, Austin had
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misused the product. The appellate
court found that Austin had not
misused the sweeper. Misuse is
using the product for a purpose not
intended or foreseen by the manufacturer. The purpose of the sweeper was to sweep gravel, the exact
task for which Austin employed it.
The court stated that "careless"
use of a product for its intended
purpose is not the same as misuse.
Garlock also argued that Austin's use of the sweeper in a manner contrary to the warning was
tantamount to misuse. The court
held that a warning negates strict
liability only if following the warning would have abated the danger.
In this case, although Austin's use
of the sweeper near the roof s edge
compounded the danger, Garlock
was still strictly liable because the
sweeper was dangerous even if the
warning had been heeded. The
court stated, "[i]f a product is
unsafe regardless of whether the
user has followed the manufacturer's warning, the user's careless
failure to do so is simply contributory negligence." Accordingly, the
appellate court agreed with the
trial court's denial of Garlock's
motion for directed verdict based
on a misuse theory.
Manufacturer Waived Objection to Inconsistent Verdict. Garlock lastly contended that the jury
verdicts against it, as manufacturer, but for Lincoln, as seller, were
inconsistent and required a new
trial. The court agreed that, absent
special circumstances not present
in this case, if the manufacturer of
a product is found strictly liable,
the seller also is liable. The court
declined to consider the issue,
however, because Garlock had not
raised the objection in a timely
fashion. According to the court, a
party waives an inconsistent verdict objection if the objection is
not raised before the jury is dismissed. Garlock failed to raise the
objection until nine days after the
trial. Thus, the court considered
the objection waived.
Mark A. Myhra

ADVERTISEMENTS
FALSELY ALLEGING
"PERMANENT HAIR
REMOVAL" VIOLATED
THE FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION ACT
In Removatron International
Corporation v. Federal Trade Com-

mission, 884 F.2d 1489 (1st Cir.
1989), the United States Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit held
that deceptively advertising a hair
removal machine violated section
5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act ("FTC Act"), 15 U.S.C. §
45. Additionally, the court granted
the government's motion to prohibit continued advertising in order to prevent future economic
harm to potential purchasers of the
machine.
Factual Background
Removatron International
Corporation ("Removatron") and
Frederick E. Goodman marketed a
hair removal machine, or epilator,
which used tweezers combined
with a burst of radio frequency
energy ("RFE") to destroy hair
follicles, thereby removing unwanted body hair. The Federal
Communications Commission
("FCC") approved Removatron's
machine to emit RFE at a particular frequency. Removatron advertised that the machine permanently removed hair. Removatron's
advertisements asserted that the
epilator was "clinically tested,"
that the machine (rather than its
RFE) was approved by the FCC,
and that the RFE completely destroyed hair follicles by heating the
surrounding tissue.
Removatron advertised its
machine mainly in beauty industry
trade magazines. Salons usually
purchased the machine for
$4,000.00, and charged individual
customers $35.00 per one hour
treatment. Removatron instructed
the purchaser that several treatments were required in order to
obtain permanent hair removal
and that such treatments might not
work for everyone. Machine owners and operators in turn communicated the same information in
(continued on page 82)
81

Loyola Consumer Law Reporter
Epilator Advertisements Violate FTC Act (continued from page 81)
written or oral form to their customers.
The Administrative
Law Judge's Decision
The Federal Trade Commission (hereinafter referred to as "the
government" in its capacity as a
party in this action and as "the
Commission" in its capacity as
adjudicator) filed a complaint
against Removatron, claiming that
the company's advertisements violated section 5 of the FTC Act
because the company did not have
a reasonable basis for its claims.
Section 5 of the FTC Act stated
that "[u]nfair or deceptive acts or
practices in or affecting commerce,
are declared unlawful." 15 U.S.C. §
45 (1988).
The Administrative Law
Judge ("ALJ") found that Removatron's permanent hair removal
claims were ambiguous and that its
disclaimers were ineffective. Furthermore, the ALJ concluded that
Removatron's permanency claims
were establishment claims. Establishment claims are statements,
purportedly supported by scientific evidence, that a product works.
In contrast, non-establishment
claims are simply statements that a
product works. Additionally, the
ALJ found that Removatron's ads
impliedly claimed that the FCC
approved the entire machine, not
just the RFE.
The ALJ also held that, to
have a reasonable basis for claims
that assert scientific substantiation, Removatron must possess
two well-controlled scientific studies in support of those claims.
Because it lacked such support,
Removatron's advertising violated
the FTC Act. Furthermore, the
ALJ found that Removatron's advertisements caused significant
emotional and financial injury to
consumers.
Based on these determinations, the AJ entered an order
which required that Removatron
(1) cease advertising that its machine permanently removed hair,
until the company obtained two
scientific studies to support those
claims; (2) include in its hair re82

moval advertisements a disclaimer
that only temporary removal is
possible; (3) provide a copy of the
ALJ's order to previous purchasers; and (4) give future purchasers
a copy of the order. After the ALJ
entered this order, Removatron
appealed the decision to the Commission.
Removatron's Appeal to the
Federal Trade Commission
The Commission also found
that Removatron made establishment claims, which the Commission held must be supported by
well-controlled scientific tests. The
Commission defined a well-controlled scientific test as one in
which a skilled person, who has
expertise in the field, conducts
tests using generally accepted procedures and evaluates the results in
a disinterested manner. However,
unlike the ALJ, the Commission
held that one well-controlled test
would be sufficient to substantiate
the establishment claims. Because
Removatron did not possess any
such tests, the Commission agreed
with the ALJ that Removatron
violated the FTC Act. Although the
Commission's findings were generally consistent with the ALJ's, the
Commission held that Removatron's customers suffered no emotional injury.
As a result of the Commissioner's findings, the Commission
modified the ALJ's order by requiring Removatron to discontinue claims of permanent hair removal until it obtained one wellcontrolled scientific study that provided support for the permanency
claims. The Commission eliminated the requirement that Removatron provide future purchasers
with a copy of the order. The
remainder of the ALJ's order was
affirmed. Thereafter, Removatron
petitioned for review in the United
States Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit.
The First Circuit Court of Appeals
Removatron challenged the
Commission's requirements that it
support the establishment claims
with a well-controlled scientific

study, and that it include a disclaimer in future advertising. The
company argued that by requiring
a scientific study prior to making
permanency statements, the Commission precluded Removatron
from making even a non-establishment claim that the product
worked. Further, Removatron argued that such a requirement was
beyond the scope of the Commission's authority to issue orders.
Broad Discretion to Rule on
Unfair Practices. The court explained that the Commission had
broad discretion to issue orders
dealing with unfair practices.
Moreover, Congress had placed
primary responsibility in the Commission for developing such orders. Therefore, the courts would
not interfere with those orders unless there was no reasonable relation between the remedy and the
unlawful practice, or the order's
prohibition was not sufficiently
clear or precise. Removatron only
challenged the reasonable relationship between the terms of the
Commission's order and Removatron's unlawful acts.
In reviewing the scope of the
Commission's order, the court
considered various factors. The
court relied on five factors to justify the broad remedy that the Commission ordered: (1) Removatron's
deliberate violation of the FTC
Act; (2) the substantial potential
for economic harm; (3) Removatron's past and continued use of
the deceptive advertisements; (4)
the average consumer's difficulty
in evaluating these claims through
personal experience; and (5) the
pervasive government regulation
of this device, which is likely to
lead a consumer to believe that the
questionable claim has a basis in
fact. The only factor weighing
against a broad remedy was that
Removatron had not previously
violated the FTC Act. The court's
analysis of these factors verified
that the Commission's order, directing Removatron to obtain scientific substantiation before making permanency claims, was
neither unreasonable nor an abuse
of discretion.
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Disclaimers of Permanent
Hair Removal. In addition to the
Commission's order requiring scientific support of permanency
claims, the court also reviewed the
Commission's requirement that
Removatron include a disclaimer
whenever its advertisements
claimed that its machines removed
hair, and send a copy of the order
to prior purchasers. Removatron
contended that this requirement
was "corrective" -

an advertising

requirement that commanded disclosure regardless of the future
advertisement's content. The court
explained that directing Removatron to send a copy of the order to
all past purchasers was not a corrective advertisement requirement; rather, this requirement
would guarantee full compliance
with the Commission's order.
Moreover, requiring the disclaimer
in future advertisements was not
corrective but was an affirmative
advertising requirement that demanded disclosure only when certain claims were made. The order
was not corrective because the
Commission only required Removatron to include the disclaimer
when the company claimed that its
machine removed hair.
Sufficient Evidence. Removatron also challenged whether sufficient evidence supported the Commission's findings. Removatron
first attacked the finding that it
had deceived the public by conveying the message that scientific tests
supported its permanency claims.
The company attempted to defend
its advertisements by advancing
several arguments. Removatron
contended that the company never
claimed that its machine was 100%
effective in permanently removing
hair for all people all the time. The
court found it irrelevant that Removatron did not explicitly make
this claim. The overwhelming message of the advertisement that the
machine would remove hair permanently for most people most of
the time was sufficient to support
the Commission's findings.
Additionally, Removatron
contended that the company qualified its advertisements by stating
that the machine would not work
on everyone and that one could
only attain permanent hair removVolume 2, Number 3/Spring, 1990

al after several treatments. Again,
the court disagreed with Removatron and held that these qualifications were inadequate and ineffective because they failed to dispel
the message of the permanency
claim. Furthermore, Removatron
argued that the only relevant audience was the beauty industry. The
court found that the relevant audience, in addition to the beauty
industry, included potential purchasers and customers of purchasers. Purchasers and customers
were the relevant audience because
Removatron's sales personnel gave
brochures and other information
to the purchasers, who passed the
information on to potential clients.
Therefore, Removatron's advertisements reached an audience outside of the beauty industry.
Removatron also argued that
"clinically tested" did not mean
"supported by rigorous scientific
tests." The company claimed that a
lay person could determine that
"clinically tested" simply meant
that the product had been successful in a clinical setting, not that
well-controlled scientific tests had
been performed. The court rejected this argument and held that
Removatron failed to offer any
proof that the lay person would be
able to make this distinction.
At the same time that Removatron petitioned for review of the
Commission's order, the government sought an injunction pendente lite. An injunction pendente
lite forbids an act and takes affect
during the actual progress of a suit.
The government sought this injunction because Removatron continued to make its deceptive claims
during the course of the lawsuit.
Since the Commission's order
would not otherwise be binding on
Removatron if Removatron appealed the case to the United States
Supreme Court, the court granted
the injunction. The court concluded that the injunction was necessary to prevent future economic
harm to potential purchasers who
would be exposed to the deceptive
advertisements.
Cathleen R. Martwick

NEW YORK LEMON
LAW'S MINIMUM NEW
VEHICLE WARRANTY
PROTECTION DOES
NOT VIOLATE THE
COMMERCE CLAUSE
New York's "Lemon Law",
N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 198-a, provided a minimum warranty of two
years or 18,000 miles for each new
car purchased and registered in the
State of New York. An organization representing the domestic and
foreign car industry challenged the
statute, charging that it impermissibly interfered with interstate
commerce. In Motor Vehicle Manufacturing Association of United
States v. Abrams, 720 F. Supp. 284
(S.D.N.Y. 1989), the United States
District Court for the Southern
District of New York held that
section 198-a(b) of the Lemon Law
did not per se violate the commerce clause, U.S. Const. art. 1, §
8, cl. 3, by regulating manufacturers, agents and dealers who did
business outside of New York.
However, the court struck down
the portion of the statute requiring
out-of-state dealers and agents to
send written notice of owner complaints to the manufacturers. The
court upheld the remainder of the
statute because its benefits clearly
exceeded the burdens it imposed
on interstate commerce.
Background
The Motor Vehicle Manufacturing Association of the United
States ("the Association") included trade associations that represented the interests of domestic
and foreign car manufacturers, importers, and distributors. The Association claimed that section
198-a(b), which in effect established a minimum level of new
vehicle warranty protection, violated the commerce clause of the
United States Constitution. According to the Association, section
198-a(b) was per se invalid under
the commerce clause because it
regulated interstate commerce, it
"opened the door" to inconsistent
state regulation of an area requiring uniformity, and it impermissi(continued on page 84)
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